Repost of the Navy War College Transcript: A Must Read.

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Overall post is in two parts. The original post sarted with this intro:

Bruce Beach was gathering information from the Navy War College Internet site and its analysis/expectations/presentation of the true situation and outcome of y2k for government/military organizations. As of a few minutes ago, early a.m., 6/5/99, the page disappeared. Bruce had not bother to download it. OOOps!! If anyone else did, I would greately appreciate haveing a copy of it. One of Bruce's comments: Allocate yourself at least a couple of hours for the job. This is IMPORTANT. It tells you WHAT the government expects to happen. What the government is going to say. What the government is going to do. What the media is going to say. What big businesses and financial giants are expected to do. What the government expects people in general to do. What the relationship is expected to be to other countries. What the government expects the world to be like after recovery. NONE of this has EVER been available elsewhere before. This is the single MOST IMPORTANT document you can read.http://

This is the address that was and now isn't: http://www.nwc.navy.mil/dsd/y2ksited/y2kproj.html

Thanksalot, LuLou

-- Luana Alika (luana@walkon.net), June 05, 1999

Answers

Damn!

i would like to have read it... can anyone help out here???

-- Andy (2000EOD@prodigy.net), June 05, 1999.

Here is the mirror site:

http://www.geocities.com/ResearchTriangle/Thinktank/6926/y2kproj.htm

-- (being@helpful.2you), June 05, 1999.

U.S. Naval War College Year 2000 International Security Dimension Project

GroupSystems Inputs for 4 March 1999 DoD Consequence Management/CINC Strategies Workshop

I. Y2K Mania/Countdown Phases: Feedback on Policy "Do's and Don'ts"

INSTRUCTIONS: The slide below presents our generic advice to a notional country's elite regarding their potential "management" of the Y2K experience within their borders. For this pair of Y2K event phases, please offer your feedback along the following three lines:

Tell us what we got right (known knowns) Tell us what we got wrong (known unknowns) Tell us what you think we're missing (unknown unknowns).

Slide: Policy "Do's and Don'ts" for Mania/Countdown Phases

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

CBMs = confidence-building measures F2Q = flight to quality NGO = non-governmental organization PVO = private voluntary organization

A. What Advice We Got Right [additional comments on inputs appear within brackets]

Need to plumb the interaction between public and private transcripts further [editor: referring to difference between official public pronouncements offered on Y2K and more closely-held contingency plans]. No matter how publicly we determine to approach the issues, there will inevitably be public and private transcripts. Rather than try and pretend to have transparency, we need to think about the relationship between the two operational modes. [Transparency works only if we can insure that all players are being equally transparent--this may be hard to do.] I think you are correct about the "no preemptive crackdowns" but I don't expect many of your Big Ten countries to follow the advice. Singapore, Indonesia, and China immediately come to mind. Israel has already set the precedence for this. [What are you thinking of in the reference to Israel?] [In reference to China, I think you mean a crackdown on the media--for example, stricter controls on Internet access in the lead up, to prevent the rumor mill from getting out of hand.] The ability of a CINC to follow successfully many of these axioms depends on the organizational format; that is, the United States cannot be perceived as the unilateral dispenser of advice and nostrums, but must speak "in council." Many countries are inherently suspicious both of our motives and our approaches. In effect, multilateralize the approach. [Suspicion of American motives is an immense factor. Few countries--especially those most suspicious--appreciate the multi-dimensionality of American voices, intentions, and policies. Crash course in communications needed.] I hadn't thought about movements of people. This could provoke one of the most extensive refugee problems in history. I think the CINCS need to be more forceful in getting the true Y2K status from nations where troops are deployed. How much to we really now about the ports in Japan and South Korea? Your advice is good conceptually, but would be very difficult to implement effectively. Government speaks with a plethora of voices and acts through countless agencies and offices. Very hard to keep all that in synch. That problem will be compounded by the empirical fact that anything/everything the government does is bound to be misperceived by someone, somewhere--sometimes with dramatic, unpredictable results. Who would have expected that a small operation by ATF to enforce firearm regulations would result in a federal building being blown up? [The conspiratorial paranoia about the US government--both domestic and abroad--is one of the great wild cards in this game. Local organization and human contacts are critical in keeping them down. At some point before 2000, government agents need to make contact with as many people as possible--before the s--- hits the fan.] Quiet warnings: use real care here--could be the triggering mechanism for an idea or act that otherwise may not have been thought of or acted on. Also, quiet warnings can take on aspects of "cultural invasion" in some societies and be acted on no matter what the consequences. Even quiet warnings will be taken as preemptive crackdowns in some quarters. Perhaps the answer is to refocus some of our intel efforts to what actions some may have planned and respond accordingly. [Quiet warnings that introduce the threat of new rules may work: e.g., if some government begins trouble (invasion of neighbor) they will not survive the effort (counter to what Hussein experienced in Desert Storm).] All this seems focused on internal actions. We need a set of advice to leaders with regard to how they posture toward their neighbors, international institutions, and cross-border activities. It will probably be important for us all, at least within DOD, to have a group understanding/decision point when we pass from one phase to another. This is particularly important in respect to actions that need to stop (e.g. influencing decision making) at a point in time. Prioritize efforts not country-by-country but "world-by-world," that is, some worlds, such of the OECD countries, and a couple of transitional areas (e.g., East Central Europe) should be the primary focus of our effort. In effect, focus on the engine of the modern world and those who are and will be members of the "global economy" club. There is an interesting and very important sociological phenomenon occurring between some of the owls and roosters responsible for national-level political or financial policy. It has already begun and will begin to harden as we approach 1 January. The owls ridicule even the rational roosters as the owls' fears of what panic may mean becomes more palpable. The more reasonable roosters become even more concerned as they see the owls' continuing disinformation about what is ground truth concerning levels of remediation/confidence in our systems working properly. This in turn makes the roosters (that is, the reasonable ones, not the wackos) dig in their heels, because their perceptions are that those who should be responsible are not being so. This is all to say that there will be much greater distrust and lack of cooperation at the highest policy levels unless a bridge can soon be found. Dr. Landes' approach is, I believe, correct. The owls' approach will not work for this crisis. It is all pervasive. A proper approach should be to encourage populations and entities to have some preparation just as they would buy insurance against an unlikely event. That doesn't mean it will happen, but it would calm fears among a great number of people in the US. [The hardening of boundaries between roosters and owls is the single greatest risk to clear and successful planning.] Shaping the media is going to be very difficult in the age of the Internet. I think that the more authorities try to assure the population, the Net will provide a vast and lively playground for playing out all sorts of scenarios, centralizing conspiracy theories, etc. Civil libertarians already oppose "excessive" military involvement in domestic civil matters. Notwithstanding the appeal in some people's minds of accessing human and material capabilities held by military, I'd suggest we must be very conscious of potential objections, and should carefully fold in a soothing message in areas of "sunset clauses" [editor: referring to rule sets with predetermined expiration dates] of such organizations or use arrangements.

B. What Advice We Got Wrong [additional comments on inputs appear within brackets]

Across all: we need to understand the competitive nature of some activities in society--i.e., some sectors of society are competitively driven and thus may see the Y2K issue as a basis to gain an advantage over their peers, customers or the larger society. Most of the policy recommendations shown presume a commonweal approach; this does not allow for competitive behavior. A new dimension in policy recommendations is needed. Charter/authority relationships between elements of government involved in mitigation may be sub-optimal to build requisite public trust, genuine sharing and sense that "we're all in this together." Hard to distinguish "fellow travelers" from the main issue. 9999 is a very close cousin to 000, and can and should be seen as some gauge--what gauge? Anticipating the discussion is worthwhile. Advice on not promoting security-based solutions also assumes commonwealth approach. There may be a need to advertise our ability to enact security-based solutions early on as a preventative measure to malevolent acts, i.e., those who will want to take advantage of Y2K to further their own agendas. [Agree. Publicizing our ability to deal with certain negative situations usually helps to prevent them from happening in the first place.] For a country like China, the leadership needs to be very careful about releasing information about the problem. Any hint of problems within the banking sector, for example, could trigger significant financial flows, buying of dollars, etc. So even if there are problems, in a society not equipped yet equipped to deal with free flows of information, err on the side of less is better. Several major industries are using or will use leper lists to cut off non-compliant participants. Airlines are the most prominent example. Electrical grids are designed to island and cut off offending components in order to prevent damage to grid machinery. There may be examples in telecom and finance. For those industries planning to cut off "lepers," exhortation as is suggested won't do any good. There will have to be concrete steps to influence their plans. Regarding encouragement of private-public cooperation: a law enforcement (LE) focus on information sharing and mitigation inherently conflicts with inherent (and residual) role of LE in areas of investigation, regulation and enforcement. Consequence is the "Branch Davidian" types--predisposed to believe the worst from government and LE in general--feel the assignment of these missions to LE as validation of their apocalyptic views. Solution is to either establish a purposefully-built entity of government ("born good") as focal point, or a confederated approach that blends organizational equities and cultures. [Here some kind of amnesty may change the dynamics. There is jubilee thinking about debt forgiveness; we may want to do something similar in terms of at least some kinds of "normal" police actions. As with limited search warrants, if Y2K cooperation reveals law-enforcement problems, unless they are critical, they get ignored.] Re: "offer quiet warnings/don't change the rules": there needs to be a mechanism to mitigate scarcity-driven price gouging. Dramatic price increases in essential commodities will present a social and political problem. Re: "fellow travelers": If a system is unable to handle the problem of the "nines," it is unlikely that it will be able to handle Y2K. DOD should be looking to those early failures to anticipate future crisis situations. As time draws short, friendly and not-so friendly nations will be looking to the US Government for direct technical assistance. Will the USG have such expertise available? Who controls it? Who gets it? What long and short-term results can be expected? This problem is NOW! Re: "vulnerability vs. development": Question the assumption of a straight-line relationship between the degree of national development (X-axis) and the vulnerability to network interruption (Y-axis). While the assumption of direct, linear correlation is intuitively comfortable, I suggest that in some areas (examples to follow) increasing development may lower vulnerability. For example, in the US we have three competing long distance telephone service providers (ATT, MCI, and Sprint) each of whom can pick up some of the load if one is dropped. But in lesser-developed countries with but a single telephone network, the vulnerability is then higher. For example: my MOST card is good at many different ATM networks so that the loss of one is but an inconvenience. In other parts of the world, ATMs are rare and centrally controlled and thus the system is single-point vulnerable. [In addition, in many countries some systems are more advanced than others are. i.e., China's financial sector is very dependent on IT, its power sector, less so, with many plants still using manual controls. In fact, China probably has the greatest mix of advanced and older systems virtually across every sector, of any country. In addition, urban areas are much more developed IT-wise than rural areas, where Y2K will hardly be noticed, and urban areas vary greatly, i.e., Shanghai much more advanced IT-wise than most other cities. I am concerned that the individual impact on each person, including you and me, is in the realm of information overload and non-specific focus. Our natural response is denial (head in the sand) and fear based. I believe that all our efforts need to be evaluated first on the basis of our fears. Use of Maslow's "Hierarchy of Needs" is a good starting point for this evaluation. We need to be very pro-active in our direction to our personnel and by extension their families and communities. Encourage and support simple emergency prep of food water. This can be through the use of such channels as the Red Cross publications. Once this is done, it will help individual availability (i.e., full attention and interest) in doing their duty as we request. Proactive internal direction will serve our purpose especially as any Y2K readiness activity is aimed at a very non-specific threat. Quiet warnings (e.g., gasoline) that trigger inventory run-ups closer to the point of delivery/sale will help in reducing a scarcity problem caused by a distribution. The delivery problem is not totally a supply question. Hoarding in this situation creates a disappearance-from-stocks problem rather than a net increase in consumption. Expect military support to domestic problems, especially in an election year run up. Hurricane Andrew response changed dramatically when the emergency coordinator for Dade county came out of a meeting with fed response team and said in tears of frustration live on national TV "Where the hell is the cavalry?" The White House changed the response tempo, and military support went up by multiple orders of magnitude. [Bravo! Very astute comment. White House reaction to that was "Never again!"] Engagement with any entity, country, intel organization, etc., may have a higher probability of success if we can bring some value-added object to the table to give a reason/incentive for engagement.

C. What Advice May Be Missing [additional comments on inputs appear within brackets]

Need to be aware of CINC's limitations on what he can reasonably be expected to do. Much more constrained than domestic, both in things he can do or say, and resources available. The baseline for any country is its own survival and well being. In addition, the rulers in power want to keep themselves there. This will come to the fore in a crisis of this magnitude, and could fundamentally change the rule set of how these countries interact. The CINC needs to continue to think regionally, and attempt to keep the country leaders thinking big picture and long term. How possible is it really to develop a coordinated USG worldwide "expectations management" program? Help friendly countries to develop a similar approach to social resilience (works best in democratic cultures). This sets up cooperation beforehand and, if successful, frees all involved to deal with problems abroad. From the information we have been given, it looks as though the United States is the big winner in the Y2K game. We organize the remediation, we sell the new hardware, we poke around others' computers, and we are far ahead in remediation. Far from being seen as a crisis, this can be an enormous opportunity. [Or opportunities to create even more mistrust for our country. The winner is often seen with jealousy and contempt.] [Yes, mistrust -- but nonetheless, opportunities do exist.] [Very interesting point. Could force a significant reordering of our foreign aid priorities.] CINC needs guidance from higher-ups on his mission, priorities, resources, etc. The standing guidance found in current documents like the CPG and JSCP may not be applicable. Expect lots of surprises from authoritarian countries. They are not in the habit of giving out bad news (think of leaders' sicknesses) and will hide Y2K problems as long and as hard as they can. Concerned that everyone is going to be experiencing and reporting Y2K related events. Coordination Centers are being established in many federal agencies and will be feeding the National Response Center with their perceptions and requirements. Without an agreed-to government-wide Y2K lexicon, a common operational picture will be impossible to achieve and the resulting triage of CINC or any resources will be--at best--problematic. Are the CINCs prepared for the possibility of having to perform 20 or 30 NEOs in the first three months of 2000? Will they be able to take care of US military dependents in foreign countries? Are they prepared for the possibility that they may be the scapegoats for local problems abroad? This phase seems to be a quiet, low-noise attempt to get ready while keeping everyone's emotions down. Someone better be planning, resourcing, staging, mobilizing and setting the stage for escalation. Triage early . . . what do we want to do versus what we can do . . . prioritize before it's a crisis. Your point on optimism relative to checks by DOD and civil organizations is valid. Question becomes how these interrelate and interaction impact overall capabilities? Geographic CINCs need to be protected by policy up front (ASAP) from domestic support issues in order to be able to respond to regional mission requirements, for good solid national security reasons. If we don't, we may solve problems at home a little faster and end up with a world that is unacceptable to our national interests for a long time. [This is an important issue, but the view is expressed in very CINC-centric parochial. The President sets priorities and it simply is not feasible to think in terms of "protecting" the CINCs from the Commander in Chief in the lawful exercise of his constitutional responsibilities. Here's the reality: the decision on priorities (domestic vs. international) will be inherently political. Can any of us imagine the President telling a Governor, "Sorry, I have to take your National Guard troops away from their mission of maintaining order and alleviating suffering in your state so I can send them to Ghana." I think not. CINCs must be prepared for the possibility they may only have extremely limited resources for a while, depending on how serious the domestic consequences of Y2K turn out to be.] Ability to assign causality of failures/problems to "Y2K" vs. human opportunism is difficult in any case, but severely exacerbated by time constraints, i.e., it is NOT good enough to get the "right answer," it must be done very quickly, to suppress or control emotions, uncertainty and attendant anxiety. Leads to question: in THIS case, is a RELIABLE, but "fuzzy"/partial answer preferable to an excellent and comprehensive fix, some time later? Answer is not obvious: The "quick fix" would require revisitation to install comprehensive correction later (again), at additional time/effort/cost. Will we (reliably) have the time and resources for this approach? Can we tolerate obviously incomplete answers and if so, for how long? Start now to shape the outcome, set the stage to come out ahead. How do you establish early on who are authoritative experts on this issue and get them out in front of the public, something which has not happened so far. Only one person stood when President Clinton mentioned Y2K during his State of the Union speech. I found this remarkable. But of course, no one wants to be alarmist, so who is to be believed? Everyone has an axe to grind. Re: omniscience of USG: The track record of the USG in fixing complex social issues is not all that great. Perhaps we need to rely more on the ability of people and institutions to adapt and survive. If so, the USG position should be to encourage adaptation and emergent behavior. Make it clear--quietly--to governments involved in potential conflict areas, that taking advantage of Y2K-related distractions would be very dangerous, i.e., the US will continue to honor its security commitments around the world.. The U.S. is already the only superpower. It is also the leader in nearly every aspect of computer technology, both hardware and software. Add to this its leadership in the whole Y2K issue and the situation is ripe for assaults on American nationals, on U.S. embassies, commercial targets (McDonald's?), and other carriers of the American presence. Concern for the service member's family is more than an issue for that service member. It is possible for that member to be in a secure environment, yet their family "in harm's way"--particularly in foreign countries. This is also a morale issue and a logistical issue, should we have to exercise some type of NEO. DOD may be asked to assume non-traditional roles. Will drug traffickers take advantage of disruptions in Air Traffic Control systems to increase routes and flows? Will cross-border migration increase, as some governments prove incapable of providing basic services? Time and resources are key, particularly in Mania Phase. The CINC needs to have more than a set of unrealistic Y2K missions. They probably need a clear set of priorities and areas that they do not need to support, driven from DOD leadership. How do we deal with potential Hollywood exploitation (i.e., production of "disaster flicks") of the Y2K Crisis? [At least a dozen films or specials are already in production. They will undoubtedly shape public anticipation as to what will happen in 2000.] Should there be, can there be, a Y2K annex to theater engagement plans that prioritize and define sorts of things that a CINC might want to do in his AOR?

Go Back to Main March Workshop GroupSystems Report

Go Back to Y2K Project's Documents List

-- NSA Outreach Office (icu@Hillary's_office.com), June 05, 1999.

U.S. Naval War College Year 2000 International Security Dimension Project

GroupSystems Inputs for 4 March 1999 DoD Consequence Management/CINC Strategies Workshop

II. Y2K Mania/Countdown Phases: Feedback on Possible CINC Missions

INSTRUCTIONS: The slide below presents a draft list of possible CINC missions for this pair of Y2K event phases. Please offer your feedback along the following three lines:

Tell us which missions you think are most likely to occur (known knowns) Tell us what side effects may occur if such missions are undertaken (known unknowns) Tell us what additional missions you think may have to be performed (unknown unknowns).

Slide: Possible CINC Missions During Mania/Countdown Phases

A. Missions Most Likely to Occur [additional comments on inputs appear within brackets]

Keeping their service members (and the public) informed. The real goal is to avoid putting out a single inaccurate message. The rest of the world wakes up--huge resentment against US abroad. Engage with regional militaries to at least encourage awareness of potential problems. Be concerned about other countries believing that US is taking advantage of the Y2K problems. CINC needs to convene a series of meetings within his AOR of key players from the states concerned to publicize and shape the perception of the problem, to organize coalition mechanisms, and to collaborate (less publicly) with key allies in the intel/info area where we can coordinate efforts. Plan for likely multiple contingencies, like NEO and HA/DA, as well as review in this context our existing plans. Highly visible (political) humanitarian-based, techno-caused events, weather, WMD events, or accidents. Chernobyl and Bhopal-type events will be priority demands because they are also media (fear-based) events. Planning needs to have ready quick-reaction teams, NBC capabilities and generators to help cool (graphite bed) reactors. Such planning will be used either domestically or internationally. Testing any Contingency Plans may be difficult. These plans will have to simulate failures, while the political climate appears to be averse to allowing any simulation to appear to be some type of "DOD assumption" about Y2K disruptions. [The input we have gotten from the White House Y2K group is to go ahead and test Contingency Plans to provide the public with the assurance that we can handle any situation. It is not seen as a failure for us but rather as an assurance that we will be able to perform our mission no matter what happens.] Reevaluate our essential elements of information so that we can better focus our intel assets. Different "equities" within USG will advocate different missions and/or "flavors" based on pre-existing cultures, etc. Absent a spanning strategy or resolute top-level policy to sort out these conflicts, the various advocates will each pursue individual, tailored agendas which are likely to benefit only themselves, although each will believe he is acting in the overall best interests of the nation. Resolve the disconnect regarding who is responsible for determining the reliability of foreign/host nation infrastructures. CINCs must work with their Services/Components and the Services with the local infrastructure providers to determine the reliability of these infrastructures through the Y2K date transition period. Assess own and allied forces Y2K compliance and interfaces. The CINC OPEVALS are part of the process, but must be ongoing and of broader scope to address critical infrastructures. [State is also gathering this data via our embassies on host countries.] Key is to be proactive with information early--don't wait until the fall. Early and frank engagement reduces the likely range of misunderstanding, moves states past the denial stage, and provides time to plan for preventive actions with high payoffs. Visible preparation/discussion for counter terrorism regarding malevolent IO piggybacking on Y2K and fellow travelers will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. [Not necessarily--it could show we have the capability to counter and thus act as a determent.] I can't say if they will be most likely, but I can say that military assistance to civil agencies will be the number one priority. Period. Whatever forces are left over, which could well be almost all of them if domestic problems are mild, will be available for missions abroad. The amount of information/decision making required by the President will be a bottleneck. Y2K authority for the CINCs to respond to humanitarian and especially techno-caused events should be pre-planned. Provide strategic, operational and tactical thinking from the "bottom up" to the Interagency. Favor reassurance over deterrence and compellence. Do internal thinking on what our priorities will/should be. CINCs need to first identify their most crucial "choke points"--what HAS to work within foreign infrastructures for them to do their general and specific missions, plus any that the NCA may identify during Y2K. The CINC should not assume "business as usual." It will not simply be a matter of where the CINC's goals lie in the national security priorities that will emerge, but he will also have to manage getting local and regional resources and services needed to perform missions at all levels. GOAL NOW: Find out what kind of "work-arounds" can be set up if local infrastructures fail. Work back several steps in the process as if you, the CINC, were the actual foreign government or entity trying to resolve its own Y2K problems. Ask lots of WHAT IF questions of everyone that you rely upon to do anything. First and foremost, regional CINCs will be expected to protect American lives and property. Our ambassadors will ask us to provide assistance to host nations. Information on the expected Y2K threat continues to come into focus. Target evaluation and publishing of information in critical infrastructure areas should be done as a basis of Threat Assessment. Will there be electric power at specific locations, military bases, major cites etc.? The DOE words reflect not alarming the public, but what is the actual assessment given all the factors? Again from a humanitarian approach, will DOD resources be asked to get fuel to hospital emergency generators? Prioritization and preplanning can mitigate difficulties in such responses and probably well within existing resource allowances. Intel collection for Y2K and for /IO in general requires a new set of collection requirements that we haven't defined/developed; the system doesn't know which questions to ask.

B. What Side Effects May Occur with Missions

I see no way that you can eliminate media venues of any kind with our strong culture of freedom of the press. I don't see how the public will allow CINCs to do this for any reason. Rather than eliminate I believe they need a strategy to counter and defuse it. An unforeseen side effect is that the "system" may come to see the DOD as the Mr. Fixit of social problems. Panic reactions in USA frighten other countries; restive populations jump the gun on aggression at a perceived weakness in US. This will feed the conspiracy theories, and could set up the US/CINCs to take the blame if things go south. Might be better to hang back and come in to help fix the problems after they occur. Most activities--even in execution of existing policies and plan--will be seen to have other motives; hence, consequences will be highly unpredictable. So, the strategy should be to use the military as little as possible, i.e., highly selectively. Recommend moving away from the word "protecting" legitimate media venues. It connotes military police surrounding newspaper building or TV station or crew. Rather, I think the CINC should establish policies for media and where they can go and what kind of protection they will receive if there is an outbreak of fighting just as he does in any similar situation (i.e. Desert Storm). But don't think they should be doing anything different or special because of Y2K. There are force structure considerations in doing non-traditional missions. Two MTWs justify a lot of force structure, Theater Engagement waters it down further, and there is a fear of ending up with the uniformed Peace CORPS. Doing intel prep and IO in advance of the "war" is perfectly normal for DOD/CINC and does not presuppose that the "war" will happen. But doing so for socio-techno "wars" may cause the populace to assume that the event is going to occur as the DOD is planning it!

C. What Additional Missions May Be Necessary?

Be proactive in providing the US with information on local preparations and local military Y2K compliance. Be prepared to respond effectively to Host Nation requests for technical assistance. Pulling guidance/priorities from the NCA; forcing triage and desired regional outcomes. Connections through the Internet of various conspiratorial groups worldwide. Downloading of the anarchist handbook from the web. In the pre 2000 stage, the greatest weaknesses may come from the best prepared because they are the most IT intensive. This may give a false impression of weakness to other countries that--only temporarily--feel at an advantage. Training and exercises--it is basic to the military that we conduct training and exercises in advance of the operation. How do we do training and exercises for Y2K driven intervention? Also, to much of the outside world, military training and exercises are seen as a de facto recognition that the problem is going to happen--self-fulfilling prophecy? Hold down the fort, along with embassies, while constrained resources limit the amount of action we can take in any given area or country. This includes the full range of military response from humanitarian assistance to major theater war.

Go Back to Main March Workshop GroupSystems Report

Go Back to Y2K Project's Documents List

-- NSA Outreach Office (icu@AL's_office.com), June 05, 1999.

U.S. Naval War College Year 2000 International Security Dimension Project

GroupSystems Inputs for 4 March 1999 DoD Consequence Management/CINC Strategies Workshop



-- Dave (aaa@aaa.com), June 06, 1999


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