Y2K AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A FINAL REPORT (Part 2)

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PART TWO OF Y2K AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A FINAL REPORT

The computer components to be fixed include systems for satellite management, missile attack early warning, and space control. In fact, Dvorkin admitted that roughly a third of the nuclear Y2K budget is now being spent to reprogram existing software, with the rest being put towards replacement of embedded hardware modules at these vulnerable sites.

On the face of it, these statements seem contradictory. However, there is an underlying logic to the arguments. The key is in the distinction between the dispersed network associated with early warning of US launch activities and the more direct, top-down command and control of Russian weapons.

Russian officials are essentially arguing that the telecommunications connections between the General Staff, political leaders, and lower controllers of deployed ICBMs are impervious to Y2K problems, so that no gaps will develop in the authorization process for launch of weapons. However, this still leaves open the question of satellites, radars, ground-based data receiving stations, and the communications links between these various systems and top commanders for the early warning of missile attack, which occurs prior to the authorization-launch stage of the alert process. The US intelligence community has reached conclusions similar to those of General Dvorkin in regard to Russian early warning systems.

Existing non-Y2K Dangers in Russian Nuclear Operations

As the history of computer errors in nuclear operations has shown, redundancy in sensors and data processing nodes is essential to avoid accidents. Unfortunately, the integrity of Russian nuclear operations has steadily declined over the last decade due to severe shortfalls in military expenditures.

The existing gaps in the early warning network may increase Russian reliance on streamlined command procedures with a greater chance of human-machine errors. Military and political leaders can now choose among a variety of alternatives for improving quick-launch capabilities during a crisis if needed. One such option would give the civilian political authorities "push-button" control of forces without the intervention of the military's General Staff in the authorization process. Another option is a back-up launch authorization system named "Perimeter," often called "The Dead Hand" by analysts. In the event that a US first strike would overwhelm the early warning capabilities and "decapitate" Russian leadership (as shown by ground-based nuclear detonation detectors and loss of communications), this system would automatically send up an ICBM with communications transceivers housed in the nose cone. Once at a sufficient height, this system would remotely transmit unlock codes and launch instructions to on-site human launch controllers for a large portion of the ICBM force. Less dramatically, existing plans for pre-delegation of launch codes could allow lower commanders to act on their own during tense crises if it is believed that the General Staff has been taken out by an American first strike. In all of these cases, Y2K-related computer failures could be magnified by the loss of human checks and balances in the Russian command system, if military and civilian leaders were to pick one of the above options to ensure credible retaliatory capabilities in the face of a potential US first strike.

US Initiatives to Avoid Nuclear Accidents

On September 2, 1998, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin issued the "Joint Statement on the Exchange of Information on Missile Launches and Early Warning." As summarized by the United States Information Agency (USIA), "The US and Russia will develop arrangements for providing each other with continuous information on the launches of strategic and theater ballistic missiles...detected by their respective early warning systems."

To plan and implement the joint declaration, interagency teams held sessions in September 1998, December 1998, and February 1999. No concrete proposals on the timing, logistics, and scope of data sharing were generated or discussed during the first two meetings. To reinvigorate the talks for the third meeting, the US amended the original concept for a shared early warning facility in Moscow. A new track was to be created for Y2K specifically that would not require Russia to supply its own early warning data. Instead, the US would construct a smaller facility outside Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado, the "Center for Year 2000 Strategic Stability," to which the Russians would be invited to monitor US data during the period December 15, 1999-January 15, 2000. In technical terms, the facility was to be constructed along the lines of the shared air traffic control systems in Berlin during the Cold War.

NORAD and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) decided to proceed unilaterally with construction efforts. The facility has now been completed, and the only remaining technical step is the creation of direct communications channels between the Colorado facility and Russian command posts, an endeavor that will require active participation by the Russian defense establishment.

The Center will consist of two Russian officers sitting alongside a US military officer and a senior US civilian officer, who will be in voice communication with the US early warning command center, NORAD, inside nearby Cheyenne Mountain. Plans call for the Center to operate from December 27 to January 6. Russian facilities will be linked to the Center by voice networks.

However, the United States and Russia have since identified Y2K problems that would prevent the full operation of all but one of the existing seven direct communications links, or "hotlines," that guarantee immediate communications between U.S. and Russian leaders. Edward Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, has told the Senate Special Committee on Y2K that U.S. and Russian communications experts are working to correct the problem.

Conclusion: Alternative Options for Alleviating the Dangers of Y2K

Given the continuing uncertainties with Russian and US systems, elected leaders should still give serious consideration to policy moves that would lessen dependence on split-second early warning data. In addition to the shared warning facility, the simplest options for reducing Y2K risks would bolster existing Russian remediation efforts. They include:

*Providing funds for the salaries of Russian computer scientists. Russia is believed to have a substantial pool of computing expertise, but simply lacks the finances to use their own talent effectively.

*Providing, free of charge, the most recent and effective versions of Y2K software assessment and repair tools.

*Providing additional advice on Y2K repair procedures and (more importantly) management techniques, to improve the efficiency and coherence of Russia's program.

*Providing a combination of two or more of the above options. Without some US financial aid, it is doubtful that the other options would prove particularly effective.

Senator Richard Lugar advocated these very steps in a late September hearing on Y2K and Russia held by the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Problem. Lugar argued "In my opinion, an 'insurance policy' in this area is a good investment... The cost of efforts to address potential threats today will be miniscule in comparison to the costs of responding to a tragedy should an incident occur."

Potential assistance for Russian Y2K remediation programs and the plans for a shared early warning facility do nothing to address the more basic problem of US-Russian "hair trigger" force postures. Roughly 4,400 warheads in Russian and US arsenals are in "ready to launch" mode. For the US, the three required steps for launch can be implemented in one minute or less. Given the gaps in its capabilities, Russia has been forced to put increased emphasis on both first-use of nuclear weapons and quick retaliation in a crisis. While the US can and should offer technical and monetary assistance as soon as possible, such measures should not be touted as a cure-all.

A more comprehensive and less risky means of avoiding accidents would be to reduce Russian and American dependence on continuous early warning information and 15-20 minute decision schedules for nuclear launch.

Unfortunately, there is very little time for a committed bilateral arms control program that would include dramatic de-alerting options. Russian Presidential action is constrained by lingering distrust over Kosovo and increasing reliance on nuclear weapons as a guarantor of Great Power status. Nonetheless, this does not mean that we are stuck with the weak options that the US has favored thus far. The US is dealing with Russia from a position of strength and can afford to make compromises for safety-related reasons without at the same time undermining the need for a credible retaliatory option. Unilateral measures could be undertaken in the short term that would increase security and still leave the US with an unquestioned advantage in strategic arms. Representative policy options include:

*Withdrawing forward-deployed Tridents from the North Atlantic and putting all Tridents on "modified alert." Currently, several Trident submarines are stationed close to Russian borders and are on "high alert" status, so that missiles can be launched almost as quickly as US ICBMs (within 10 minutes or less). It is these offensive Trident missile attacks that Russian early warning satellites cannot detect, and which could hit key Russian leadership and weapons sites within 15 minutes. Stationing Tridents farther away (for instance, in the Southern Hemisphere) and lengthening launch procedures would dramatically reduce Russian incentives for streamlining their own launch procedures. It would also help ensure that the main threat to Russia comes from US ICBMs, for which Russia has relatively better satellite and radar coverage, and which have 10 minutes more flight time to Russian targets.

*Removing to storage all MX/Peacekeeper warheads, which are geared towards preempting Russian retaliatory capabilities and destroying deep leadership bunkers. As with the previous option, this alternative would reduce incentives for cutting corners on launch authorization procedures, since it would give Russians much higher confidence in their ability to retaliate after a US first strike. (A similar step would be to leave warheads in place but cut the electronic connections between regional LCCs and the deployed MX missiles.)

There is one last paradox in official STRATCOM policy that bears scrutiny. Many officials in both the US and Russia have downplayed the significance of Y2K for safety of daily nuclear operations. This minimization of the problem is not based on a belief that 100% of all Y2K problems have been found and corrected in both US and Russian systems. Officials still openly worry about screen blackouts, communications outages, and faulty early warning data.

Rather, it stems from the "common sense" belief that neither side will act on erroneous, incomplete, or ambiguous information, and also that neither side will infer the presence of nuclear detonations if Y2K errors cause the partial blackout of telecommunications networks for command posts and launch sites. According to this argument, the end of the Cold War will prominently figure in decision-maker's calculations, as will the a priori expectation that Y2K could indeed cause information-based errors of various sorts. The ultimate result is that human operators will have a near-automatic, gut-level dismissal of any positive identification of attack for either side. Putting these vague intuitive thoughts into a coherent logical form, it is hypothesized that the data outputs of C4I systems will be believed if there is no electronic indication of a nuclear attack, but that these self-same systems will be seriously doubted if there is positive indication of an attack, however large or small that indication may be.

At the least, this mindset questions the entire relevance of launch-on-warning and the continuation of US-Russian dependence on early warning information systems in the post-Cold War world. If evidence of enemy launch will be largely ignored or suspected as false by the very people responsible for alerting the political leadership in both Russia and the US, what is the use of keeping weapons in a ready-to-launch mode? What is the utility of continued reliance on complex and expensive early warning sensors and supporting software systems? These questions need to be seriously addressed in the future by policymakers, whether or not Y2K ends up being anything more than a proverbial blip on the nuclear radar screen.

Full report at: http://www.basicint.org/y2k99part1.htm [in 5 parts]

Email version available from: Paul Swann

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Tom Atlee * T

-- Jean Wasp (jean@sonic.net), December 01, 1999


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