Stratfor.com

1630 GMT, 010919

Summary

Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat up to now has been successful in driving a wedge between the United States and Israel while retaining plausible deniability for suicide bombings in the Middle East. But in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States, Arafat's strategy is in shambles. He is now trapped between an unrestrained Israel and the anger of the Palestinian public.

Analysis

Immediately after the events of Sept. 11, STRATFOR wrote that Israel would be a major beneficiary of the attacks. We said: "Given that pressures for Israel to restrain operations against the Palestinian Authority will decline dramatically, it might be expected that Yasser Arafat, anticipating this evolution, will rapidly change his position on suicide bombings and become more accommodating to Israel. In effect, today's events have wrecked Arafat's nearly successful drive to split the United States from Israel."

That appears to be what has happened. After agreeing to a truce with Israel, Arafat took the unprecedented step Sept. 18 of ordering his forces not to fire even in self-defense. In return, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has ordered a halt to "unilateral action" by Israeli forces. The differing formulas tell it all. Sharon has promised to withhold strikes unless the Palestinians strike first. The Palestinian Authority has committed itself not to strike under any circumstances.

Behind all this is a grim reality for Arafat. He was executing a superb strategy. The suicide bombing campaign against Israel allowed Arafat some plausible deniability, at least with Europe and the United States. He argued that he was unable to restrain the bombers because they were controlled by other groups such as Hamas. The more intensely Israel attacked the Palestinians, the more frequently the suicide bombings would occur. This argument allowed Arafat to shift responsibility for events away from himself toward Sharon and Palestinian radicals. He could play the victim of both while generating sympathy for the Palestinians and support for himself.

The intent of his strategy was to drive a wedge between the Sharon government and the United States. Sharon's response to the Palestinians had been to launch what was, in effect, a war against the Palestine Authority's infrastructure: attacking command facilities, assassinating leaders and moving into towns to clear out armed Palestinians. It was little noticed that on the night of Sept. 10, Israeli forces surrounded the town of Jenin as part of this conflict.

But following the Sept. 11 suicide hijackings in the United States, Arafat's strategy is in shambles. He is still in the middle, but now he is trapped. He fully understands the United States will no longer restrain Sharon. Arafat also knows Sharon well enough to know he will seize any provocation to press the war to a new level of intensity.

On the other hand, Arafat may not have complete control over the suicide bombers attacking Israel. After the July 2000 Camp David summit, Arafat deftly maneuvered himself into a position wherein his policies were aligned with those of more radical Palestinians. They had reached a mutual accommodation of sorts: Arafat would use their attacks on Israel to position his diplomacy, and the radicals would carry out operations to their satisfaction and permit Arafat to exploit them for political ends. This cooperation, or parallel play if you will, was not the same as Arafat being in genuine control of all elements.

This means that although Arafat sees no alternative to accepting a cease-fire, it is far from certain that all Palestinian groups will accept it. Indeed, both Islamic Jihad and Hamas have opposed the cease-fire, with Islamic Jihad vehemently opposing Arafat's participation in a U.S.-led coalition against Osama bin Laden.

It will be much more difficult for these groups to operate now. Arafat might not have controlled them before, but his intelligence apparatus refrained from interfering with them. That is primarily what the Israelis were furious about because they felt Arafat could have shut down the bombers if he had wanted to. Now it is in Arafat's interest to do so. He will certainly try and to some extent succeed -- but not perfectly. There will be bombings and Israeli retaliation.

Arafat is now trapped between overwhelming, unrestrained Israeli force and the genuine anger of the Palestinian public. They understand full well that Arafat has been trapped by events and forced to retreat. What they don't see are the benefits that will accrue from the retreat: Hamas and Islamic Jihad will argue vehemently that Arafat and the secular leadership of the Palestinians are politically bankrupt and that it is time for a new generation to take charge -- a generation that is religious in perspective.

We strongly suspect that those who planned the Sept. 11 attacks were fully aware of the dynamic they were creating. Assuming the attackers knew what they were doing, they understood their actions would paralyze the American financial markets and air traffic system. They also knew that by extension, their actions would strengthen Sharon and weaken Arafat. That is precisely what they wanted because it would serve to increase the strength of Islamic forces within the Palestinian community.

If this develops as logic dictates, then Arafat will find himself with nowhere to go but into Israeli arms. His one hope is that if he reaches a settlement with the Israelis, the Israelis will understand the benefit of improving economic conditions for Palestinians, who have been devastated by occupation and war. If Arafat cannot deliver the kind of victory that was possible a few days ago, he must at least deliver a better life for the Palestinians.

For that to happen, the Israelis must be prepared both to support Arafat politically and to infuse capital into the West Bank. But this would require radicals to permit a period of economic stabilization -- and that is not very likely.

-- Anonymous, September 19, 2001