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Afghan Response and the U.S. Theater of Operations 0010 GMT, 011008

Summary

As the U.S. military commences strikes on Afghanistan, warnings are increasing about the threat of further attacks on the United States. Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network likely has more forces deployed in the United States. The question now isn't if they will strike again, but where and how they will do it.

Analysis

U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said last week that any American attack on Afghanistan has an almost 100 percent chance of triggering retaliation in the United States or in ally countries. It has been STRATFOR'S position that the al Qaeda network had multiple groups deployed in the United States on Sept. 11. We also argued that these groups have only minimal and highly secure contact with command centers outside the United States, making their detection by U.S. intelligence extremely difficult.

One of the problems that U.S. intelligence has is proving conclusively that there are no further terrorist groups operating in the United States. One possible means to accomplish this would be through the capture and interrogation of those who have comprehensive knowledge of the deployment of al Qaeda's forces. It is not clear though that anyone has that sort of detailed information. The entire structure of the network seems to have been designed to avoid creating such a center of knowledge. Moreover, those people -- if they were known -- are not readily accessible.

However, numerous operatives in the United States and overseas have certainly been arrested. Some of the initial clues came from information deliberately left behind by the attackers in cars and apartments. The Sept. 11 attacks were extremely well coordinated, and unless one assumes that such meticulous planners suddenly became very sloppy at the end, which is possible but not likely, then many of these leads seem designed to allow U.S. security forces to quickly scoop up auxiliary attack operatives.

This misdirection achieved two things for al Qaeda. First, it tied up the FBI in the pursuit of elements that no longer posed a threat. Second, it deliberately implicated others in the first attack group while providing confusing or misleading information about other, self-contained groups, of which the first operatives had no actual knowledge. It tied up bandwidth without threatening other attack groups.

Therefore, we must assume the following:

1. Other groups were present in the United States prior to Sept. 11. 2. Details about them were unknown to the first group. 3. Enough information about them has come to light to cause Rumsfeld's warning, without enough information to capture them.

Using these factors, one of two propositions is true. The perceived existence of follow-on groups is actually part of a disinformation campaign to destabilize the United States with minimal effort. Or, there really are groups ready to go into action.

Logic dictates that the second proposition is the case. The network used up 19 attackers on Sept. 11. There may have been others who had to abort missions. Al Qaeda is not careless. There was an element of risk in the operation, in which the attackers might have been detected and the attack failed. They would not put all of their eggs in one basket. The presence of 19 attackers means that this was only a fraction of the available forces, perhaps half, perhaps less. Therefore, at least one and possibly more forces are available to carry out further attacks.

The issue is, therefore, if they will hit, when they will hit and where and how they will hit.

1. Al Qaeda did not deploy these forces not to use them. They fully expected that a successful attack Sept. 11 would lead to a U.S. military response. Their goal, clearly stated, is to inflict damage on the United States on an equal or greater basis as the U.S. inflicts casualties on them and Afghanistan. The greater the damage, the more their prestige in the Islamic world grows. Moreover, they may harbor hopes that a series of stunning attacks might undermine the American will to war. Therefore, if they can attack, they will. 2. Al Qaeda prefers to attack intermittently, when the threat of detection is low. It is not clear that they can do this now. First, the group is in a warfighting environment where it needs to be able to strike back in tempo with the enemy. Second, their operational units are always in danger of detection. The longer the wait, the more likely they are to use valuable assets. They need to show they are here and they need to demonstrate U.S. vulnerability. This is a case where an attack sooner rather than later is critical.

This leaves the question of where and how the attacks will occur. In this respect al Qaeda has a tremendous advantage. Each prior attack (embassies, the USS Cole, Sept. 11) was unique in terms of timing, target and method of attack. The target set in the United States is enormous and U.S. security capabilities are stretched beyond their limit.

The enemies' advantage is the large target set. Their disadvantage is limited resources. They have specialized in the past in using limited resources, such as box cutters, to appropriate enemy resources, such as airplanes, in carrying out missions. This leveraging of resources is a key. But after Sept. 11, the ideal method of attacks, by using aircraft, is going to be difficult to replicate.

It is somewhat easier to determine what the attackers would like to hit than how they will carry it out. The Sept. 11 attacks had two characteristics. First, they caused terrific casualties. Second, they caused a shutdown in key U.S. systems, such as air transport and financial markets. That is the principle al Qaeda wants to replicate. They would like to cause horrific casualties while causing a national systemic shutdown that severely damages the economy.

In other words, leaving casualties aside, they are following a model they learned from strategic air campaigns, which is to go after key social systems and shut them down. Key social systems include the power system, from refineries to power plants, land transport, including critical bridges and tunnels and maritime systems such as ports. Attack methods may include destroying refineries with multiple truck bombs, using barges loaded with explosives to destroy critical bridges during rush hour or sinking oil tankers in harbor channels, releasing massive oil spills.

The critical point, of course, is that this is pure speculation. Al Qaeda is well trained in these options and needs no advice. They have had time to prepare to implement round two if they wish, and therefore they will do so at the time that appears strategically, operationally and tactically best to them.

And that differentiates this war from any other fought by the United States. As the United States tries to focus on the Afghan Theater of Operations, the optimal response from the Afghan side will be to focus on the U.S. Theater of Operations. There is a symmetry to asymmetrical warfare, where each side tries to maximize its capabilities to the detriment of the other. It must not be forgotten that al Qaeda's special operations teams remain the Afghan's most potent counter.

-- Anonymous, October 08, 2001