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http://www.economist.com/printedition/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=876925

The al-Qaeda network

Eight down, many more to go

Nov 22nd 2001 From The Economist print edition

A flurry of arrests does not mean the movement can be written off

“IN OUR classes, we have entered the field of aviation, and even slit the bird's throat.” Thus a mysterious interlocutor known as Shakur—possibly one of the hijackers who attacked the United States on September 11th—to a comrade based in Madrid in a cryptic conversation on August 27th. “But my objective is the objective, and I don't want to go into details,” the caller added, after swearing the listener to secrecy.

These and other bizarre snippets of evidence were presented this week by Baltasar Garzon, Spain's best-known magistrate, as part of his case for the continued detention of eight militant Islamists, resident in Spain but mostly of Syrian origin, who had been arrested on November 13th. The recipient of the telephone call was Abu Dahdah, also known as Imad Eddin Barakat Yarbas, the leader of the gang of eight and—according to Judge Garzon—the head of a “terrorist cell” which formed part of the al-Qaeda network, whose ultimate godfather is Osama bin Laden. Mohammed Atta, the 33-year-old Egyptian “suicide pilot” who seems to have led the September 11th attacks, had a copy of Abu Dahdah's phone number among his possessions, and he had visited Spain a couple of times earlier this year.

Judge Garzon's evidence, gathered over several years, leads him to the conclusion that the Madrid-based gang were actively involved in preparing the September onslaught, and that they were working under the supervision of Mr bin Laden and other Afghanistan-based godfathers. Maps of several European cities, including Dublin and Milan, as well as forged documents and stolen credit cards, were found in their homes. In court papers, the judge presents a detailed picture of Abu Dahdah's contacts with militant Islamists in other parts of Europe—including Britain, to which he made more than 20 trips—Turkey, Afghanistan and Indonesia.

One of Abu Dahdah's oldest comrades, Chej Salah, who had helped him to foment militant Islam in Madrid during the mid-1990s, later went to Afghanistan and played a prominent role in the terrorist-training network, according to Judge Garzon. Mr Salah, in turn, worked closely with Abu Zubaydah, a Saudi-born Palestinian who is one of Osama bin Laden's most trusted aides and may be al-Qaeda's “director of operations”. A smooth and effective line of communication therefore existed between the Madrid cell and the terror network's highest echelons.

The Spanish authorities have said they want to interview the eight detainees about a plot to make one or more suicide attacks in Europe, using poison gas—possibly cyanide—before the end of this year. Among the targets that Islamist terrorists are believed to have considered are the American embassy in Paris and the NATO headquarters in Brussels.

Does the wealth of evidence presented by Judge Garzon, along with a spate of arrests and seizures of financial assets in other parts of Europe, suggest that al-Qaeda's international network is finally being dismantled, just as its foot-soldiers are facing military defeat in Afghanistan? Authorities in several European countries have certainly made some progress in tracking down and arresting militant Islamists. The French authorities have been questioning several Franco-Algerian militants, including Djemal Beghal, who was arrested in July while travelling from Pakistan to Europe and initially stated—though he later sought to retract this—that he had instructions from Abu Zubaydah to attack the American embassy in Paris.

Another Franco-Algerian suspect, Kemal Daoudi, was picked up in Britain in late September. He, Mr Beghal and a French convert to Islam, Jerome Courtailler, had spent time together there, sitting at the feet of some of London's more extreme Islamist preachers. The United States, meanwhile, is hoping that Britain's courts will soon agree to extradite a Saudi comrade of Mr bin Laden and fellow-opponent of the Saudi royal family called Khalid al-Fawwaz, as well as two Egyptians suspected of links to al-Qaeda.

Perhaps the biggest blow of all suffered by the organisation was last week's death in an American bombing raid in Afghanistan of Mohammed Atef, a relative by marriage of Mr bin Laden, and described in an American court paper as al-Qaeda's military commander. And it is fair to assume that hundreds of al-Qaeda's foot-soldiers have been killed during the unequal combat of recent days. But despite this flurry of military defeats, judicial activity and detective work, those who know al-Qaeda best say it would be wildly premature to write the movement off.

The very fact that the eight people detained in Madrid stayed in one country—Spain—most of the time suggests that they cannot have played a central role in the network, according to Mustafa Alani, an associate of the Royal United Services Institute in London who has been studying al-Qaeda for many years. As Mr Alani puts it, the network differs from all other militant Islamist movements in its global reach, its focus on very high-value targets and its skill at covering its traces by spiriting agents from one country to another. Although there are some vocal Islamist preachers who like to boast of their connections with al-Qaeda, the network would never want to use prominent Islamic figures who are probably under police surveillance anyway. Its hardest-core operatives are trained to live as respectable citizens who break no laws.

The name al-Qaeda (the base) dates from the mid-1980s, when Mr bin Laden was playing a prominent role in the American-backed war against the Soviet forces who were occupying Afghanistan. At first it referred to the organisation that supplied logistics and religious teaching to the anti-Russian mujahideen. But the name was borrowed and adapted by Mr bin Laden when, in the 1990s, he became bitterly anti-American and—at first from a base in Sudan and later from Afghanistan—he built a vast network of militant Islamists whose unifying bond was anti-Americanism and opposition to Arab regimes that were deemed to be pro-American.

Where necessary, al-Qaeda will encourage some of its agents to engage in petty crime, like robbery and forgery, as a source of liquid cash; but there is usually a high “Chinese wall” separating these operatives from the prized volunteers who are preparing to lay down their lives in suicide attacks. Only three terrorist operations are viewed with certainty as being al-Qaeda's work: the August 1998 bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the suicide attack on the USS Cole, an American destroyer, in Yemen last year, and the onslaught of September 11th.

All these assaults required years of meticulous reconnaissance and planning—at least four years in the case of the embassy bombings. Also required was careful, discreet co-ordination between small groups of people who were careful never to stay in one place too long (particularly the country where the attack would eventually be carried out), and who could easily be replaced if they came under police observation.

Based on the three “successful” operations—and on other attacks which al-Qaeda has planned but has not managed to execute—analysts like Mr Alani have built up a picture of the network's preferred mode of operation. Support teams are spirited out of the country before or immediately after the operation, while participants in the suicide mission are told not to go anywhere near the scene of their intended crime until a short time beforehand. While Mr bin Laden and his comrades might well take a close interest in the operation—and send their personal representatives to liaise with the support teams—they would be careful not to put any instructions in writing or to use any other easily-intercepted form of communication.

According to Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism specialist at RAND, an American think-tank, the idea of “staunching the flow of money” to groups of Islamist extremists is not as simple as it sounds. For one thing, suicide missions are not all that expensive, in relation to the damage they cause; the terrorists' biggest asset is not wealth but desperation and willingness to sacrifice their own lives. The September 11th operations, which cost the American economy untold billions of dollars, may have cost the perpetrators only $200,000.

Magnus Ranstorp, a terrorism specialist at St Andrew's University, believes western governments may have made a mistake in focusing their rhetoric too much on Mr bin Laden, instead of stressing that he heads a large, intricate network which will not disappear instantly, even if he and his immediate comrades are killed or neutralised. Mustering public support for a continued campaign against al-Qaeda—both overt and covert—could become difficult after its leadership has been knocked out.

Western governments feel confident that they know the names of most of al-Qaeda's “consultation council”, the network's ruling body, which numbers between 25 and 30 people. They apparently include Egyptians (following the merger with al-Qaeda of one of Egypt's main Islamist movements in 1998), Algerians, Yemenis and Syrians as well as Saudis. But there is still some confusion as to how the council takes decisions, or whether it ever meets in full session—apparently not, according to Mr Ranstorp.

Even less is known about the identities and origin of the 4,000 or so fighters who are believed to form the “hard core” of al-Qaeda—some of them now engaged in a losing battle in Afghanistan, and others scattered round the world. Then there is a grey area of overlap between these core fighters and the various militant groups which al-Qaeda has helped to train, and to which it may “subcontract” operations.

Although the network's most senior bosses have always kept a close eye—through various ultra-secret lines of communication—on what their agents are doing, that may now change. After the American attack on Afghanistan, al-Qaeda's foot-soldiers have reportedly been given the green light to attack “targets of opportunity” without authorisation at the highest levels. But if the network is plotting any really spectacular attack on western targets, that conspiracy will almost certainly have been under way since long before September 11th.

According to al-Qaeda's military doctrine—as reflected in the manuals which have fallen into western hands—the network is likely to put a high value on recovering senior members of the organisation who are captured. Mr Ranstorp believes that if Mr bin Laden or any of his top lieutenants is taken alive, al-Qaeda may resort to spectacular kidnappings as a way of bargaining for their freedom.

But despite this gloomy prognosis, the successes scored by western governments—both on the Afghan battlefield and in the police stations and courtrooms of Europe—are still significant blows to the network's interests, say al-Qaeda-watchers. Whatever their precise rank, the eight suspects detained in Madrid were almost certainly people “with the capacity to inflict great pain”, according to Mr Hoffman.

By decapitating its leadership and unpicking at least part of its network, western governments may be able to neutralise, temporarily, the phenomenon of Islamist terror and fend off some horrors that might otherwise have occurred. It may be harder to persuade impatient electorates that even when that task has been accomplished, the struggle against terrorism must go on.

-- Anonymous, November 26, 2001