wreck at Blanton FL

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The ICC reports index shows file 1302 is an ACL wreck at Blanton FL 10/28/1926. The file 1302 is misfiled, what opens is file 1502, a Reading wreck in 1929. Does anyone know anything about this ACL wreck?

-- Larry E. Shankles (lshankles@kscable.com), January 23, 2002

Answers

Ron: It's hard to condense a seven page report into a few sentences, but to answer your questions: 1. A "work" order is indeed a train order. The dispatcher and operators refer to a train order authorizing a work extra as a "work" order. A "work" order can get lengthy and to let the operator know that he must copy close, the dispatcher will state that he's going to transmit a "work" order. It's operator/dispatcher lingo.

2. You are correct -- the Conductor on Extra 815 South thought the order applied to his train when in fact Work Extra 273 had already cleared for No. 40 and Extra 915 at Blanton. In report- ing for orders at Trilby, the dispatcher transmitted a message to the Conductor of Extra 815 South that he would have to pro- tect against Work Extra 273, but the Conductor denied having received the message. The Conductor, riding the engine, did not compare orders with the Engineer until the train had left Trilby. Neither the Fireman nor the Brakeman were allowed to see the order.

Would Work Extra 273 stay in the clear for Extra 815 even if Extra 915 passed first ? No. Train order NO. 20 authorized Work Extra 273 to move in either direction between Trilby and Tarpon Springs protecting (flagging) ONLY for extra 915 South (after 8:30 am) and Extra 905 North (after 1215 pm) . Once these two extras approached the work limits, the flagman would have instructions on how they were to proceed and arrangements would be made to clear the main track. A work extra MUST clear the time of scheduled trains

Where did No. 96 come from ? St. Petersburg. No. 96 was the PINELLAS SPECIAL. Being a scheduled train, the work extra had to be clear of the main track, on most railroads it's five minutes before the time shown in the timetable, or protect in accordance with Rule 99 (the flagging rule).

-- Harry Bundy (Y6B@aol.com), January 23, 2002.


I guess I can;t read train orders well enough to know exactly what went wrong. Did the ballast train arrive too early, before 815 am?

>The work train received the following "work" order Do the quotes around "work" mean the order was suspect or just that it is a "work" order, as compared to say a "train" order?

>"Eng 273 work 601 am to 601 pm between Trilby and Tarpon Springs protecting against extra 915 (note eng. no.) south after 830 am against extra 906 north after 1215 pm not against other extras and not pass extra 283 south." The ballast train had eng 815.

So one problem was the engine number was wrong? In such a case what was the procedure. I mean, wouldn't 273 stay in the siding until a train with engine 815 went by, even if a train with engine 915 went by first?

Does the "protecting" section of this order translate to "After 830 am get in a siding until you see extra 915 headed south go by, then you can return to work until 1215 pm, when you should get out of the way of 906 north and other than that there are no more extras to look out for."

What does "not pass extra 283 south" mean, that the work train was following extra 283 south and was not authorized to pass it?

>On instructions from the conductor, the ballast train left Trilby to clear No. 96 at Blanton and collided with Work Extra 273 between 25 and 30 MPH. Where did 96 come from, the schedule? And does this mean the ballast train intended to get in the siding at Blanton before 96 showed up, but instead collided with the work extra?

Thanks.

-- Ron. Wright (rondywright@hotmail.com), January 23, 2002.


This was a head-end collision between a ballast train and a work extra resulting in the death of one employee and the injury of six employees. The work train received the following "work" order "Eng 273 work 601 am to 601 pm between Trilby and Tarpon Springs protecting against extra 915 (note eng. no.) south after 830 am against extra 906 north after 1215 pm not against other extras and not pass extra 283 south." The ballast train had eng 815. On instructions from the conductor, the ballast train left Trilby to clear No. 96 at Blanton and collided with Work Extra 273 between 25 and 30 MPH.

-- Harry Bundy (Y6B@aol.com), January 23, 2002.

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